Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 19
Number 2 Winter 1996

Article 4

1-1-1996

American Wine's New Internationalism: NAFTA's
Impact on the U.S. Wine Industry in the
Established and Emerging Markets of Canada and
Mexico
Sarah E. Richards

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Sarah E. Richards, American Wine's New Internationalism: NAFTA's Impact on the U.S. Wine Industry in the Established and Emerging
Markets of Canada and Mexico, 19 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 357 (1996).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol19/iss2/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

American Wine's New Internationalism:
NATA's Impact on the U.S. Wine
Industry in the Established and Emerging
Markets of Canada and Mexico
By SARAH E. RICHARDS*

I.

Introduction

A recent declining trend in overall wine consumption in the
United States has caused many American winemakers to look towards
foreign markets for industry expansion and profit) However, American wine exports totalled less than 3% of worldwide wine exports in
1992,2 and currently only the largest U.S. wineries have established
long-term, successful export operations, mainly in Europe and Asia.
Even with American wineries' limited export experience, however,
the U.S. was still the world's fifth largest producer3 and sixth largest
exporter4 of wine in 1994. In 1993 and 1994, the total value of U.S.
wine exports reached approximately $180 million, although the overall
volume of exports slightly declined during that period.- This situation
signifies that the United States is selling more of its higher-priced pre* Member of the Class of 1996. B.A. Georgetown University, 1991. I w;ould like to
thank my parents for their constant and generally enthusiastic support of all my endeavors.
This Note is dedicated to the unparalleled wines and graciousness of the former Spring
Mountain Vineyards (1968-1992).
1. Gavin Power, California Vintners Thirst for Exports, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 3, 1994, at
A9. This declining trend in consumption is largely caused by the rapid rise and fall of wine
cooler sales in the U.S. during the 1980s which -has pulled aggregate wine statistics down
ever since, casting a pall over the entire industry .... " Steve Barsby, The Story Behind the
Numbers, WirNs & Vns, July 1995, at 16. Despite the downturn, however, U.S. consumption of table wine remains fairly strong. Id.; see also Joseph Rollo, Exports Outpace
National Marke4 WnE & VInEs, July 1995, at 18, 31.
2. Power, supra note 1, at A9. Statistic confirmed with USWineStats,Steve Barsby &
Assoc., 12685 S. Wilderness Way, Molalla, OR 9703S.
3. NVn INsrru, 7TH ANNuAL ECONOOuc RESARCH REPORT S(1994) [hereinafter WiNE INsT. STATSTICS].

4. Id. at 12.
5. Rollo, supra note 1, at 20.
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mium and table wines in the global marketplace. 6 This growth trend
in U.S. wine exports is evidenced by a 14% increase in table wine
exports during the first half of
exports and a 7% increase in total wine
7
1995 over comparable 1994 figures.
Canada is the world's largest importer of wine 8 and currently the
United States second largest wine export market according to Department of Commerce statistics for the first half of 1995. 9 However, in
both 1993 and 1994, Canada was the United States largest wine export
market in terms of both volume and value. 10 Apart from being a
steady consumer of U.S. wine exports, Canada is also an extremely
significant market for the United States due to its geographic proxim11
ity and the "similar tastes among U.S. and Canadian consumers."
While the United States primarily exports bulk wine to Canada, its
table wine market share is increasing.12 Still, in 1993 exports of white
table wine from the United States to Canada held only13 a 13.5% market share while French white wines had a 42% share.
Numerous factors converge to keep American wine exports to
Canada relatively low as compared with those of our European competitors. 4 U.S. exporters are forced to contend with high import tariffs, a complex provincial system of listing agreements, storage and
distribution restrictions, discriminatory environmental regulations,
competition from subsidized import wines, and a long European winedrinking tradition among Canadians. Yet the United States has begun
to see a reduction of Canadian trade barriers first under the CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) and now under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). CFTA and
6. Lawrence Malkin, Value of State's Exports is Growing, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Jan.
11, 1994, at 8.
7. U.S. Table Wine Exports Jump 14 Percent: United Kingdom Displaces CanadaAs
Top Market; Aussie Bulk Boom, 5 WINE Bus. INSIDER, Aug. 29, 1995, at 1.
8. WInE INST. STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 13.
9. U.S. Table Wine Exports Jump 14 Percent: United Kingdom Displaces CanadaAs
Top Market; Aussie Bulk Boom, supra note 7, at 1.

10. Rollo, supra note 1, at 21.
11. Int'l Bus.-Gov't Counsellors, Inc., Wine Inst. Int'l Trade Barriers Report, 1993
WmNE INsT. 15 [hereinafter 1993 Trade Barriers Report].
12. AmERIcAN EMBASSY, OiTAWA, VOLUNTARY REPORT, AGRICULTURAL SITUATION: WINE SITUATION AND OUTLOOK 17 (1994). See also U.S. Table Wine Exports Jump
14 Percent United Kingdom, Displaces Canadaas Top Market; Aussie Bulk Boom, supra
note 7, at 1.
13. VOLUNTARY REPORT, AGRICULTURAL SITUATION: WINE SITUATION AND OUT.
LOOK, supra note 12, at 9.

14. See 1993 Trade BarriersReport,supra note 11, at 15.
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NAFTA encourage the further opening of this strong yet tightly restricted market.
Mexico, on the other hand, represents an emerging market which
has been thrown into the spotlight by NAFTA. Many believe NAFTA
has brought a "renewed sense of enthusiasm... [that Mexico's] massive protectionist barriers of the past have begun to crumble, and that
free trade is finally taking root."15 Like Canada, Mexico's proximity
to the United States and its potential for export growth make it an
appealing market for American vintners.
However, Mexico presents some serious drawbacks to the successful importation of American wines. Mexico's warehousing and
distribution channels are poor to nonexistent, and the tariff levels
Mexico accords to the United States under NAFTA are significantly
higher than those it imposes on Chile, which has a substantial wine
export program. The central impediment, however, remains Mexico's
undeveloped wine market caused by past "economic conditions and
16
policies in a country with a very limited wine-drinking tradition."
The average Mexican drinks less than one glass of wine per year, an
amount somewhat comparable to wine consumption in Japan, where
per capita consumption is four times greater than that in Mexico but is
still less than one bottle of wine per year. 7 Yet Japan is California's
third largest wine export market behind the United Kingdom and
Canada.'8
Even with such a low consumption rate, Mexico was still the
United States fourth largest importer of wines in 1992,19 and "there is
a genuine sense of excitement among some wineries and exporters,
particularly in California, about what the future holds for selling wine
in Mexico."'2 Exporters point to the fact that 50% of the Mexican
population is under nineteen and thus more apt to try American products such as wine and wine coolers.2 ' Although there is a limited tra15. Latin America. Opportunityfor New Business Expansion, IMPACr INT'i, Mar. 1 &
15, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Latin America].
16. Exporting Wine to Mexico, 1994 Wnm INsr. 1, 1 [hereinafter Mexico Export
Report].
17. Larry Walker, Is NAFTA the Key to the Mexican Market?, WINES & VNEs, Jan.
1994, at 18.
18. 1993 Trade Barriers Report, supra note 11, at 6.
19. Id. at 23. In 1993 Mexico became the sixth largest importer of U.S. ,Mnes, just
behind Germany and Denmark. Int'l Bus,Gov't Counsellors, Inc., Wine InsL Intl Trade
Barriers Report, 1994 Wn4E INsT. 8 [hereinafter 1994 Trade BarriersReport].
20. Larry Walker, California Dreamin',WINE & SPIure INr'L, Feb. 1994, at 53.

21. Abt Assoc., Inc., Assessment of the Merican Wine Marke Draft Report, ViNE
INsT. 2-9 (Dec. 1992) (on file with WVine Inst.) [hereinafter Abt Assoc., Report].
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dition in Mexico of wine as a drink for special occasions, this tradition
is slowly expanding to include less formal occasions. Finally,
NAFTA's potential to increase the disposable income of many Mexicans and bring more international travellers to the country is likely to
affect Mexicans' exposure to and demand for fine wines, especially in
the country's cosmopolitan and vacation areas.
While actual sales in Mexico remained "sluggish" during the first
quarter of 1994, the total volume of U.S. wine exports to Mexico increased 151% over comparable exports for the same period in 1993.22
However, due to the devaluation of the peso at the end of 1994, Mexico dropped off the list of top ten U.S. wine export markets for the
first half of 1995.23 Still, many feel the enormous growth potential of
the Mexican market for American wines is too great to overlook, 4
and even if growth slows because of the country's current economic
and political instability, NAFTA has bolstered Mexico's credibility in
the international marketplace and legitimized Mexico's plan for improved long-term economic performance.' Thus, NAFTA's implementation should significantly increase the export of American wines
to both the established, but heavily restricted, Canadian market and
to the emerging market of Mexico.
This Note will focus on the impact of NAFTA on U.S. wine exports to Canada and Mexico. It will discuss the particular significance
of the Canadian and Mexican markets for the U.S. wine industry, as
well as the interrelation of NAFTA, GATr, and the CFTA regarding
wine exportation issues. Further, it will look at current tariff and
nontariff barriers in both markets and address any constitutional issues which might affect tariff reductions for wine exports in the future.
H. NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement, implemented on
January 1, 1994, creates a trading alliance between Canada, the
United States, and Mexico.26 NAFTA establishes a market with a
combined population of 360 million people and a "gross national
22. Wine Shipments to Mexico Soaringin 1994, WINE Bus. INSMER, July 16, 1994, at 3.
23. U.S. Table Wine Exports Jump 14 Percent: United Kingdom Displaces CanadaAs
Top Market; Aussie Bulk Boom, supra note 7, at 1.
24. See Latin America, supra note 15.

25. Id.
26. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 289 & 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
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product (GNP) of almost $6 trillion. 2 7 NAFTA focuses on a "gradual
and comprehensive elimination of trade barriers"28 between the three
nations, and works to phase out both tariffs and nontariff barriers,
including import quotas, licensing requirements, and technical and
distribution barriers. Other NAFTA objectives are to create express
protections for intellectual property rights, provide an efficient and
binding dispute resolution process, enhance competitiveness, creativity, and innovation, and generally improve and expand the flow of
goods, services, and investment between the United States, Medco,
and Canada.29 NAFTA does not, however, create a common market
comparable to the European Union. Instead, Mexico, the United
States, and Canada maintain sovereignty over their respective political, economic, and trade policies.-0
Specific wine trade issues make up a very small portion of the
provisions within NAFTA. However, NAFTA's specific provisions regarding wine are significant because they manifest the increasing importance of the American wine industry among U.S. exports and
international trade negotiations. NAFTA is a "major opportunity" for
greater wine trade between the United States and its two most important trading partners, Me.ico and Canada. 1 Under NAFTA, the
United States hopes to simplify and routinize wine export procedures
to these two countries while increasing the preference for U.S. wine.
Annex 312.2 of NAFTA provides: "As between Canada and the
United States, any measure related to the internal sale and distribution of wine... shall be governed under this Agreement exclusively in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement, which for this purpose are hereby incorporated into and made a part of this Agreement. ' ' - Chapter Eight, section 801 of the CFTA provides: "This chapter applies to any measure
related to the internal sale and distribution of wine .... ,, Article 807
of the CFTA addresses international obligations under the CFTA,
stating, "Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter, the Parties retain
their rights and obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs
27. JoHN MANZELLLA, OppoRTtNrrY IN Mnxico: A S't.m BusINESS GurmE 29

(1992).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 24.
Id
Id
1994 Trade BarriersRepor4 supra note 19, at S.
NAFTA, supra note 26, annex 312.2, § A.
Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987- Jan. 2, 198S, Can.-U.S., ch. 8, art. S01, 27

LL.M. 281 (entered into force Jan. 1, 19S9) (emphasis added) [hereinafter CFrA].
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and Trade (GATT) and agreements negotiated under the GATT."" a
Because NAFTA, CFTA, and GATT are significantly intertwined, an
understanding of GATr's basic features is essential to one's understanding of the CFTA's and NAFTA's subsequent provisions relating
to wine.
II1.

GAIT

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been
in effect since 1948 and has functioned as a multilateral trade agreement with the object of reducing or removing tariff and nontariff trade
barriers among its members. As of December 1994, GATT had 128
contracting parties. 35 The centerpiece of GATT is the Most Favored
Nation (MFN) clause in Article 1 of the agreement which states:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on
or in connection with importation or exportation.., any advantage,
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to
any product originating in or destined for another country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting
parties.36
MEFN status must be extended to all members in order to prevent
discrimination, allow equal market access, and provide the same minimum benefits to all members.3 7 Canada, the United States, and Mexico (which became a contracting party in 1986) are all members of
GATT. 38 Thus, the question arises whether any trade barrier reduction may be offered by one member of GATT to another under a
separate bilateral or multilateral treaty (such as NAFTA) at the exclusion of other GAT' members. Article XXIV of GATT provides for
the formation of "Free-Trade Areas" to "facilitate trade between the
constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other
contracting parties with such territories. '39 A free trade area is defined as a "group of two or more customs territories in which the du34. Id. art. 807.
35. William J. Davey, The WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview, HAND.
BOOK OF WTO/GATT DispuTm SE r.ErmN- (Pierre Pescatore et al., eds.) (Aug. 1995), at
7, 15.

36. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
37. CONG. RES. SERVICE, LmRARY OF CONGRESS, GATT (GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TAIFFS AND TRADE): BACKGROUND INFORMAnION

38. Id. at CRS-8.
39. GATT, supra note 36, art. XXIV(4).

CRS-5 (1994).
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ties and other restrictive regulations of commerce... are eliminated
on substantially all trade between the constituent territories in products originating from such territories. 40 Thus, although under GATT
the CFTA and NAFTA are inconsistent with the comprehensive goal
of MFN status for all members, GATT does permit the establishment
of free trade areas which legitimately reduce tariffs between signatories, providing GATr's other free trade area criteria are met.41
NAFTA adopts Article I of GATT which requires "national
treatment" of products imported into the contracting country. Article
III states that taxes and laws affecting the direct or indirect internal
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution, or use of products "should
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production."4 2 This national treatment provision
is often violated with regard to the importation of wine by Canada,
as
43
members.
GATT
other
and
Union
European
the
well as by
Additionally, GATT dispute resolution procedures have significantly influenced the dispute settlement section of the CFrA and
NAFTA. On January 1, 1995, the Uruguay Round agreements entered into force and established a "new international trade regime"
known as the World Trade Organization (WTO). 44 The WTO agreement launching this supernational body creates an organizational
structure along with specific rules of governance while modifying
GATr in order to bring it "into force on a definitive basis.1 45 The
new WTO/GATT agreement institutes a dispute settlement system
which requires compliance by GAT members and penalizes defiance
by allowing unilateral trade sanctions to be imposed by the com46
plaining party.
In contrast, the original GAT provided for a dispute resolution
process which was essentially nonbinding. It required that after an
40. Id. art. XXIV(8)(ii)(b).

41. Peter F. McLaughlin, Note, Mexico's Antidumping and CounterailingDuty Laws:
Amenable to a Free TradeAgreement?, LAW & POL'Y IW"L Bus., June 22, 1992, at 9, 10.
42. GATT, supra note 36, art. I.
43. Scott Morse et al., CaliforniaAgricultural Barriersto Trade. Preparationsfor the
Uruguay Round, 3 CAT. STATE WoRLD TRADE CoNs'N 19 (19S7).
44. Agreement Establishing the WVorld Trade Organization, Final Act Emboi1ing thResults of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1953, GATT
Doc. MTN/FA IIG.7.2, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; Davey, supra note
35, at 7.
45. Davey, supra note 35, at 9.
46. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Uruguay Round Final Act, Dec. 15, 1993, GATE Doc. MTN/FA IH.G.7.6, 33 I.LM. at
1226; Davey supra note 35, at 9.
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unsuccessful period of negotiations between the disputing countries,
an impartial GATT panel would review the dispute and issue a ruling
which then could be adopted by GATT members by consensus,47
However, even if a panel finding was adopted, compliance by the offending GATT member could be inordinately delayed or blocked altogether because sanctions were prohibited, unless imposed by a
consensus of GAIT members.48 Thus, dispute resolution under the
original GATT was based solely on consensus and compromise, and
GAIT had no other mechanism for enforcing compliance. Dispute
settlement provisions in both the CFTA and NAFTA sought to improve on the original GATT's weak dispute resolution process, and
both the CFTA and NAFTA dispute resolution provisions are considered binding on the disputing parties.
In past rounds, GATT successfully sought to reduce agricultural
tariff barriers, but nontariff barriers remained largely unaddressed until the latest Uruguay Round, concluded in April 1994.49 GAIT dispute resolution panels have reviewed complaints and made
recommendations relating to wine tariff and nontariff barriers. In
1985, the European Community filed a complaint with GAIT disputing specific Canadian provincial regulations which allegedly discriminated against European imports of wine, beer, and other alcoholic
beverages. The resulting panel report adopted by GAIT in 1988 concluded that the regulations were discriminatory within the provisions
of GAIT and called for their removal. 0 Although Canada accepted
the GATT panel report, it did not implement all of the panel's recommendations, much to the disappointment of European and U.S. wine
and beer interests.
IV.

CFJ3A

The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), implemented January 1, 1989, was largely based on GAIT. However, in
47. Jacqueline Ferris & Robin Room, Public Health Interests in Trade Agreements on
Alcoholic Beverages in North America, 17 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD, 235, 238
(June 22, 1993).

48. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Preface: FirstThoughts on Dispute Settlement in the World
Trade Organization, HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATI DisPtrr SETrLEMENT vii (Pierre Pescatore et al., eds.) (Aug. 1995).
49. Id.

50. GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PANEL REPORT' CANADA-IMPORT, DIsTRIBUTION
AND SALE OF ALCOHOLIC DRINKs BY CANADIAN PROVINCIAL MARKETING AGENCIES,
adopted Mar. 22, 1988, 1993 BDIEL AD LEXIS 15, [ 4 [hereinafter 1988 GATI PANEL
REPORT].
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the case of its wine-related provisions, the CFTA maintains some specific, discriminatory laws, including higher taxes and prices on imported wine and spirits which are phased out very slowly over an
extended period. 5 ' Unlike the pre-WTO/GAfT agreement, the
CFTA has an expedited dispute resolution process which is considered
binding upon its contracting parties.' The CFTA further improved
the original GATT dispute resolution provisions by placing strict time
limits on its dispute settlement process to prevent dispute resolution
recommendations from taking years to formulate (as happened in
some cases under GAIT provisions).53
Certain sections of the CFTA pertain specifically to wine. For
instance, Canada's pricing discrimination against imported wines in
the form of differential markups must be eliminated over a seven year
period, ending in 1996.- However, the CFTA contains exceptions including a provision protecting any remaining markup differentials if
the Canadian province retaining them can show a significant difference in the administrative costs of service or handling between the
U.S. and the Canadian product. -" Thus, the CFTA deals more specifically with wine-related tariff and nontariff barrier issues than does
GAT.
V.

GATr, CFTA Incorporation into NAFTA

NAFTA incorporates much of GATr and the CFTA into its
trade agreement framework. NAFrA's dispute resolution process
generally replaces that under the CFTA (both NAFTA and the CFTA
dispute resolution procedures are very similar, although NAFTA provides some further safeguards), 56 but determining whether GATT or
NAFTA takes precedence depends on the context of different trade
circumstances and disputes.57 NAFTA generally provides for disputes
arising under both NAFTA and GATT to be settled in either forum at
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Ferris & Room, supra note 47, at 239.
Id.
Id.
CFTA, supra note 33, art. 803.
Id.
Kristin L. Oelstrom, Note, A Treaty for the Future, 5 Lw & P01:Y I'NrL Bus. 83,

85 (1994).
57. Peter Morton, U.S. Adopts CanadianTactics: Yogurt Ploy Used in Grain War, FL-;.
PosT (Ottawa), Apr. 21, 1994, at 11.
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the complaining party's discretion."8 As a result, disputes brought
under NAFTA may be transferred to proceedings under GATT's jurisdiction, leading to potentially inconclusive results, at least under the
original GATT dispute resolution framework. 9 Because NAFTA
provisions expressly cover wine and distilled spirits (but not beer), the
contracting parties have generally applied NAFTA over GATT in
these alcoholic beverage disputes because of NAFTA's more efficient
and effective dispute resolution process.60
VI.

Background: The Canadian Wine Industry

In Canada, British Columbia and Ontario are the primary producers of Canadian wine, but Quebec and Nova Scotia also contribute to
domestic wine production. 6 ' Prior to the implementation of the
CFTA in 1989, there was a widespread belief that Canada's domestic
wine industry would crumble in the face of increased international
competition. Traditionally, Canadian wines have been undistinguished in comparison to their U.S. and European competitors, 62
and thus, the Canadian provincial governments adopted a "fortress
mentality" to encourage and protect the local wine industry from foreign competition.63 With the implementation of the CFTA followed
by NAFTA, many observers predicted that a torrent of California
wine would virtually wash away the Canadian wine industry.
However, "the industry that free trade was supposed to kill" instead has become Canada's newest export.64 Under NAFTA, Canadian wines have been losing some of their domestic market share to
imports, 65 but their quality has improved "spectacularly." Canadian
wines are penetrating the higher priced segment of the domestic Canadian market, and are beginning to be exported.66 Even so, the Ca58. David S. Huntington, Symposium on the North American Free Trade Agreement:
Settling Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J.
407, 417 nn.79-80 (1993).
59. Joseph A. McKinney, Dispute Settlement Under the U.S.-CanadaFree Trade Agreement, 8 J. IN''L ARB. 89, 92 (1991).
60. Ferris & Room, supra note 47, at 239.
61. Richard Mendelson et al., Wine Trade with Canada: A Case Study in Trade Deregulation, 7 IN'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 91, 95 (1989).
62. Ian Austen, Uncorking Expansion: Ontario's Wine Industry is on a Roll and Export Prospects Appear Bright, GAzEarE (Montreal), Aug. 26, 1994, at C1.
63. Mendelson, supra note 61, at 95.

64. Id.
65. CanadianWinery Renamed; Big Ads Planned,WiNE Bus. INSMER, Sept. 3,1994, at
2.

66. Austen, supra note 62.
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nadian provinces retain their protectionist attitude toward wine
imports, and as certain tariff and nontariff barriers are phased out
under NAFTA, old barriers remain and some new ones have sprung
up.
VII. Provincial Controls
In Canada, the provincial governments retain tight control over
all import and export transactions involving wine, beer, and other alcoholic beverages. Each province has an alcohol monopoly administered by a government Liquor Control Board (LCB). The monopoly,
through provincial legislation, directs every aspect of wine supply and
distribution within its province. Further, a federal statute restricts the
importation of alcohol except under provisions established by the provincial LCB. 67
The LCBs heavily regulate the quantity of foreign wine entering
the province. They also impose stringent distribution and environmental regulations which discriminate against foreign exporters, set
retail price levels, and restrict marketing and availability of the wines
imported to the province. Even though certain protectionist measures
are expressly prohibited or phased out by NAFrA, some LCBs imposed new barriers which continue to severely restrict the importation
of U.S. wines.
VIII. Tariff and Nontariff Barriers
A.

Listing Agreements

The Canadian provinces protect their domestic wine production
primarily through two practices: listing requirements and discriminatory price markups. With regard to listing requirements, NAFTA's
annex 312.2 stipulates that:
[A]ny measure relating to the listing of wine... of the other Party
shall: (i) conform with Article 301 [national treatment], (ii) be
transparent,non-discriminatoryand provide for prompt decision on
any listing application... (iv) be based on normal commercial considerations, (v) not create disguised barriers to trade, and (vi) be
published and made generally available to persons of the other
6S

Party.

67. Canadian Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act, 4 RS.C. 1955. ch. C1-3 (1970)

(Can.).
68. NAFTA, supra note 26, annex 312.2, § B (3)(a)(i)-(vi), (b) (emphasis added).
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In general, for any wine to be sold in a particular province, the
LCB must buy and "list" the wine.69 There are two categories of listings: (1) general listings which apply to wines that stay in monopoly
stores as long as they meet LCB-established sales quotas, and (2) special listings for wines which are offered for sale for a very limited period in the province.70 American wine exporters find that general
listings are difficult to obtain, and "[s]pecial listings alone are too limited to build consumers' ' 71confidence in U.S. labels and thus prevent
growth in brand loyalty."
"Delisting" is also a practice adopted in some provinces. Delisting imposes a monetary penalty on and revokes the listing of the imported wine if it does not meet its sales quota within a specified time
period. 72 Since the criteria for listing may include product quality,
price marketability, relationship with or similarity to other products
already listed, and performance in other markets, 73 listing and delisting requirements particularly hurt new wines trying to enter the Canadian market. In 1992 the British Columbia LCB announced that it
would only accept new listings in "growth categories," which do not
include U.S. wines74 (contrary to statistics). Thus, in many provincial
markets, listing and delisting practices are a disguised barrier to trade.
B. Consignment Sales
The initiation of consignment sales in some Canadian provinces
constitutes another trade barrier which relates to listing requirements.
Quebec and British Columbia only accept new listings on a consignment basis.75 Under such a sales practice, a new winery which places
its product on consignment with an LCB must wait until the wine is
sold at retail before receiving payment. Also, the winery must pay the
shipping and storage charges until the wine is sold, and if the wine is
not sold, it is returned at the winery's expense. 76 This practice discriminates against foreign imports because of the added risk and costs
it imposes, and is untenable for small wineries which often cannot afford delayed payment and the risk of its wine being returned.77
69. 1988 GAT" PANEL REPORT, supra note 50,
70. Mendelson, supra note 61, at 94.

2.6.

71. 1d.
72. 1993 Trade BarriersReport, supra note 11, at 16.
73. 1988 GATT PANEL REPORT, supra note 50, 2.6.
74. 1993 Trade BarriersReport, supra note 11, at 16.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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C. Minimum Pricing
With regard to pricing restrictions, many provinces set a "reference price," a minimum price below which any wine may not be
sold.78 This discriminates against imported wines by perpetuating the
overpriced domestic industry and not allowing import wines to compete on a price basis. In most provinces, the reference price is determined after the import wine price has already been increased by other
LCB markups. However, Ontario assesses the reference price before
any other markups are applied, thereby drastically increasing the cost
of import wines in that province.79
D.

Warehousing and Distribution

Some provincial warehousing requirements also clearly discriminate against foreign wine imports. Annex 312.2(5)(a) of NAFTA
states that "[a]ny measure related to distribution of wine or distilled
spirits of the other Party shall conform with Article 301 (national
treatment). 8' 0 However, British Columbia requires wine importers to
participate in an Agent Stocking Program which requires importers to
store wine in a bonded facility before shipping it to the LCB warehouse. 8 ' Because the importer must pay for the bonded facility, the
handling costs are increased above those of domestic vines which can
instead be shipped directly to the LCB warehouse., Both domestic
and imported wines are also charged for storage in this warehouse.
Delivery between the LCB warehouse and the retail store must
be accomplished via provincial monopoly deliverers who may not be
the most cost-efficient for importers.- This regulation contributes to
the anticompetitive pricing of import wines. Further, these delivery
restrictions increase the difficulty of complying with various environmental regulations, which often require the establishment of a bottle
collectionlrefil system. 4 Some provinces also levy a punitive enviroumental tax on wine and other alcohol bottles which are not refilled
or collected."
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id
NAFTA, supra note 26, annex 312-2(5)(a).
1993 Trade BarriersReport, supra note 11, at 16.
I1d
Id.at 17.
Id
Id.
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E. Retail Merchandising
On the retail end, some provinces prohibit the sale of imported
wines by designating store locations which are strictly reserved for domestic wine sales. In Quebec, grocery stores, which account for 40%
of the total wine sales in Quebec, may only sell local wines.8 6 In Ontario, imported wines may only be sold at LCB outlets. 87 Indeed,
NAFTA "grandfathers 'in" an exception to Ontario's and Quebec's
discriminatory retail distribution practices.88 In contrast, Alberta decided to privatize the retail sales of alcoholic beverages within its
province; thus, it will no longer be listing wines, but instead will permit
private wine agents to determine what wines Albertans will drink., 9
F. Cost-of-Service Markups
Currently, the most controversial provincial barrier in Canada is
the "cost-of-service" markup. The markup is a percentage increase
over the base price of the imported wine, and the base price includes
cost of the wine, plus freight, plus federal taxes and customs duties.9 0
Such markups are imposed in order to provide increased revenue for
the provincial governments, which then pass the base cost of the wine
plus the markup along to the consumer. Cost-of-service markups
arose to replace another provincial markup-the differential
markup-which was generally determined to be illegal under GATT.
Differential markups manifested themselves as different markups for
provincial, Canadian, and foreign wines. For example, in 1986 Ontario's markup was only 1% on provincially produced wines, 48% on
other Canadian wines, and 66% on imported wines. 91 The 1988
GATr panel report, discussed earlier, found differential markups to
be illegal under GATT to the extent that they do not represent "additional costs necessarily associated with marketing of the imported
86. Id.at 16.
87. Id
88. NAFTA, supra note 26, annex 312.5(5)(b)(ii), (c). Annex 312.2(5)(b)(ii), (c)

states:
provided that distribution measures otherwise ensure conformity with Article
301, a Party may... (ii) maintain a measure requiring existing private wine store

outlets in... Ontario

to
...

discriminate in favor of wine of those provinces to a

degree no greater than the discrimination required by such existing measure. (c)

Nothing in this agreement shall prohibit... Quebec from requiring that any wine
sold in grocery stores in Quebec be bottled in Quebec, providing that alternative
outlets are provided.
89. AGMIN Counselor, American Embassy, Ottawa, Feb. 22, 1994, at 4.
90. 1988 GATT PANEL

REPORT,

supra note 50, 1 2.5.

91. Mendelson, supra note 61, at 95.
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products."'92 Under the CFTA, Canada may phase out the illegal differential markups over a seven year period. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, as the old differential markups have been eliminated,
new cost-of-service markups have arisen in their place.
A provision in NAFrA provides, "Where the distributor is a public entity, the entity may charge the actual cost-of-service differential
between wine... of the other Party and domestic wine .... 93 Thus,
while cost-of-service markups are generally legal under NAFTA and
GATT, U.S. wine exporters contend that they actually violate both
agreements because their rates reflect charges much higher than the
actual cost of service for the LCB and are thus a mere continuation of
the differential markups' discriminatory practices.' 4 Negotiations are
ongoing to reduce these cost-of-service markups? 5
IX.

Resolution of the United States-Canada Beer Dispute

Negotiations regarding the persistent trade barriers on importation of American wine to Canada were delayed over the last few years
in order to achieve resolution of a dispute over similar issues in the
beer trade. These issues included discriminatory restrictions on distribution and warehousing, price minimums, environmental taxes, and
the (infamous) cost-of-service markup.
However, unlike wine trade issues which may be regulated by
either GATT or NAFTA, GATT has sole jurisdiction over beer trade
issues.96 Still, U.S. wine exporters hoped that any breakthroughs by
means of GAIT dispute resolution in the beer sector would carry over
to the wine sector as well. The 1988 GATr panel report, which was
initiated by a European Community (EC) request to examine the
matter, found that all the Canadian provinces' liquor, beer, and wine
regulations discriminated against foreign producers. However, Canada specifically refused to implement the panel's recommendations
regarding liberalization of beer imports. 7 Canada's justification for
this refusal was that the beer portion of the panel report was "not
particularly significant" since EC beer exports to Canada only
92. 1988 GATT PANEL REPORT, supra note 50, J 4.19 (emphasis added).
93. NAFrA, supra note 26, annex 312.2(4)(a).

94. 1993 Trade BarriersReport, supra note 11, at 15.
95. 1994 Trade BarriersRepor4 supra note 19, at 17.
96. CFTA, supra note 33, arts. 1204, 1205; see also Barbara Wickens & VIlliam
Lowther, Brewing Up A Storm; Brewers on Both Sides of the BorderFoaming Over a New
Beer Trade Pact, MAcLEAN'S, Aug. 9, 1993, at 32.

97. Ferris & Room, supra note 47, at 241-42.
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amounted to one-half of one percent of the total Canadian beer market.98 However, Canada felt implementation of the beer recommendations would give the large and numerous American breweries a
"free ride" into the Canadian market, resulting in a negative impact
on Canadian brewers. 99
In February 1991 the United States filed a complaint with GATT
to compel compliance by Canada with all the provisions in the earlier
1988 panel report, and specifically with those provisions relating to
beer. 1°° Two U.S. beer manufacturers, Stroh's and H.G. Heileman
Brewing Company, spearheaded the complaint. The GATT panel
ruled against Canada again, and although Canada accepted the report,
it demanded a three year phase-out period for the relevant discriminatory restrictions, which the United States also protested. 10 1
In the meantime, Ontario, Canada's largest beer-drinking province, imposed a new environmental levy which placed a ten cent tax
on each can of beer sold.1°2 Most beer exported from the United
States is sold in cans, while domestic, Canadian beer is generally sold
in bottles. The tax did not apply to bottled beer, and thus was transparently targeted at U.S. imports. In addition, Ontario announced a
include increased cost-of-service
new beer pricing system which would
03
markups on imported beer only.'
In response to Ontario's maneuver, the United States rejected
another attempt at resolution through GAT and instead unilaterally
raised U.S. tariffs 50% on all imported beer from Ontario.'04 The Canadian government reacted with a similar tax on two U.S. brewers
who were particularly trying to access the Canadian market. 0 5 Senator Carl Levin articulated U.S. frustrations on this matter in January
1992 when he remarked, "You can buy American beer in very, very,
very few places in Canada, but you can buy Canadian beer in every
darned beer store in America. Why do we tolerate that?"'c6
98. Canada Will Accept GATT Ruling on Wine, But Not Beer Restrictions, Carney
Says, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 407 (Mar. 23, 1988).
99. ld.
100. Ferris & Room, supra note 47, at 241.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. U.S. Seeks Retaliation in GATT Against Canadian Beer Restrictions, 9 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) at 1204 (July 15, 1992).
104. Id.
105. Andy Riga, Beer Wars: Part 1, GAzETrE (Montreal), July 10, 1993, at C7.
106. News Conference with Senator Carl Levin, Federal News Service, Washington,
D.C., (Jan. 10, 1992).
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An end to the beer dispute was finally achieved through negotiated settlement in August 1993, and the punitive tariffs levied by both
nations were lifted. 10 7 Unfortunately, much dissatisfaction remains in
the beer sector, and because the resulting agreement did not conform
to the GATT panel recommendations, it is predicted to have much
less effect on similar trade barriers in the wine industry than initially
anticipated. Neither the minimum price issue nor the beer container
issue (tax on cans) was resolved. However, Ottawa did agree to
amend its warehousing requirements to make distribution of beer easier in British Columbia. Some large American breweries feel that the
settlement was equivalent to defeat1cs High distribution costs continue to make it unprofitable to export American beer to Canada, and
the agreement has had little effect on wine barriers since cost-of-service and other issues were resolved narrowly for the beer sector
through negotiated settlement rather than "on the merits" (in accordance with the GATr panel findings). 109
X.

Canadian Constitutional Issues

The dissatisfying settlement of the beer dispute coupled with the
continuing trade barriers for wine exporters to Canada under NAFTA
reflect a larger issue of Canadian sovereignty and the distribution of
power over provincial and international trade issues in Canada. Unlike most other NAFTA provisions, which may be regulated without
constitutional controversy by the Canadian federal government, 10 the
wine and distilled spirits provisions of NAFTA (and CFTA) fall under
provincial jurisdiction.11 '
Article 105 of NAFTA states, "The parties shall ensure that all
necessary measures are taken in order to give effect to the provisions
of this Agreement, including their observance, except as otherwise
provided in this Agreement, by state and provincial governments."112
Article 301 regarding national treatment further provides, "The provi107. U.S. and CanadaSettle LongstandingBeer Dispute, UPI, Aug. 5, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
108. Michael Prentice, Beer Drinkers' Hopes for Savings Vanish in Trade.Decision
Froth, OTrAwA CInZN, Sept. 24, 1993, at D8.
109. Canada Cost of Service Complaint,Status Report, Wine Inst. Memorandum, Dec.
13, 1993.
110. Glenn A. Cranker & Gary Nachshen, The Canada.U.S.Free Trade Agreement, 3
DOING Bus. CA. 29-32 (1994) [hereinafter DOING BustNEss].

111. Canadian Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act, 4 R.S.C. 1985, ch. CI-3 (1970)
(Can.).
112. NAFTA, supra note 26, art. 105 (emphases added).
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sions regarding national treatment shall mean, with respect to a state or
province, treatment no less favorable than the most favorable treatment accorded by such state orprovince to any like, directly competitive or substitutable goods.., of the Party of which it forms a part." 113
In contrast to these trade agreement provisions, the Canadian Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act" 4 grants an import monopoly to
the provincial governments. Thus, there is continuing controversy
over whether the Canadian federal government, as a party to NAFTA,
has the jurisdiction to bind the provinces to an international trade
agreement which regulates the traditionally intraprovincial issue of alcohol (wine) supply and distribution.
In accordance with the British legal tradition, Canada does not
s
consider the international treaties it ratifies to be self-executing.'I
This means that without domestic legislation facilitating implementation, an international treaty will have no effect on Canadian domestic
law. Even when legislation is enacted, a subsequent Canadian statute
can override treaty provisions. However, Canadian courts tend to interpret any subsequent legislation in keeping with treaty commitments, provided that the new
statute was not expressly intended to
1 6
commitments.
such
overrule
In Canada, the distribution of power for the regulation of Canadian commerce and trade is guided by the Constitution Act of 1867,
sections 91 and 92.217 Section 91 grants the Canadian Parliament "exclusive" legislative authority to regulate trade and commerce to the
Canadian Parliament."18 Section 92 allows each provincial legislature
to make laws regarding "Property and Civil Rights in the Province." 119 Although the Constitutional Act of 1867 seems to give broad
commerce powers to the federal government, Canadian judicial interpretation of these provisions has been quite narrow.
120
The 1881 case of Citizens' Insurance Co. of Canada v. Parsons
set the standard for Parliamentary jurisdiction over trade and commerce. In Parsons the Privy Council (predecessor of Canada's
113. Id. art. 301 (emphases added).
114. 4 R.S.C. 1985, ch. C1-3 (1970) (Can.).

115. See generally DoiNG BusINEss, supra note 110, at 29-115.
116. Id. at 29-116.

117. Constitution Act, 1867, §§ 91-92 (formerly British North America Act, 1867, 30-31
Vict., ch. 3) (U.K.)).
118. Id. § 91.
119. Id. § 92.
120. Citizens' Ins. Co.of Can. v. Parsons, 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C. 1881) (appeal taken from

Can.).
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Supreme Court) identified two categories of trade and commerce over
which the federal government had jurisdiction: (1) interprovincial or
international trade and commerce, and (2) "general regulation of
trade affecting the whole community.' 21 These categories have become known as the "two prongs" of Parsons. The court further held
that the federal government's jurisdiction under these two prongs did
not include authority to regulate a particular trade or business "such
as the business of fire insurance in a single province."'11
In the 1937 Labour Conventions case, the Privy Council also held
that if a treaty's implementing legislation relates to a matter under the
jurisdiction of the federal government, then the Parliament can implement the treaty. However, if the matter is under provincial legislative
jurisdiction, then only the provincial legislature has the power to implement it.' 2 Labour Conventions has never been overruled, and together with Parsons,it manifests the ambiguity of federal supremacy
over provincial law relating to trade issues.
More recent cases further this ambiguity. In the Margarine case
of 1951, the Privy Council struck down a federal statute which prohibited the import, production, and sale of margarine in Canada as a
means of protecting its fragile dairy industry. 24 The court held that
section 91 of the Constitution Act of 1867 does not allow the regulation or prohibition of individual forms of intraprovincial trade. 25 The
court held that the federal government had no power to regulate trade
in this manner unless the regulation was an integral part of or "necessarily incidental to" legitimate federal authority over interprovincial
or international trade. This holding satisfies the first prong of
Parsons.126
In relation to the second prong of Parsons,the Labat Breweries
case voided a federal statute regulating beer compositional requirements. 27 In Labat Breweries, the court held that the compositional
issue was not "a matter of national concern transcending the local au- Thus the category of "general regulation of
thorities power. ' ' m
trade" was deemed unsatisfied.
121. Id. at 113.
122. Id.
123. Attorney Gen. (Can.) v. Attorney Gen. (Ont.), App. Cas. 326, 351 (P.C. 1937)
(appeal taken from Can.).
124. Canadian Fed'n of Agric. v. Attorney Gen. (Que.), App. Cas. 179,194 (P.C. 1951).
125. Id
126. Id.
127. Labatt Breweries of Can. v. Attorney Gen., 1 S.C.R. 914, 945 (Can. 1980).

128. Id.
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The Canadian Supreme Court most recently addressed the "general regulation of trade"-the second prong of Parsons-in General
Motors of Canada, Ltd. v. City of National Leasing.'29 This case focused on whether a federal regulation creating a civil right of action
under the Combines Investigation Act was constitutional or whether it
impermissibly encroached on important provincial powers. Because
the act's objective was to regulate competition throughout Canada,
the court first considered four criteria to establish the validity of this
regulatory scheme: (1) whether the regulatory act operates with
oversight of an agency, (2) whether the Act is concerned with trade in
general and not specific industries, (3) whether the provinces are not
constitutionally capable of enacting the legislation, and (4) whether
the failure to include one or more provinces would jeopardize the successful operation of the act.130 These criteria serve to "ensure that the
federal legislation does not upset the balance of power between federal and provincial governments."' 31 Once the validity of the act's
regulatory scheme was established, the court then focused on the degree of relation between the specific regulation and the act as a whole.
The court mentioned two standards, the "functionally related" standard and the stricter "necessarily incidental" standard, but decided to
apply the former one to the case.' 32 According to the Court, the regulation will not satisfy the functionally related standard if it is merely
"tacked on" to otherwise valid legislation. 133 The court held that
"[c]ompetition is not an issue of purely local concern but one of crucial importance to the national economy' 34 ....[yet] the door to provincial participation should be left widely ajar.' 35 The court
emphasized that the specific regulation here was part of a "legislative
scheme aimed at deterring a wide range of unfair competitive practices that affect trade and commerce generally across Canada, and is
36
not limited to a single industry, commodity or area.'
Applying the GeneralMotors analysis, it is difficult to determine
whether NAFrA's wine trade regulations would fall within the jurisdiction of the federal Parliament. Satisfaction of the first prong of
129.
1989).
130.
131.
132.
133.

General Motors of Can., Ltd. v. City of Nat'l Leasing, 58 D.L.R. 4th 255 (Can.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id
134. I1&at

272.
267.
280.

277.
135. I& at 280.
136. Id.
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Parsonsis not automatic merely because the wine trade provisions are
found within the international framework of NAFTA. Instead, one
must determine whether the specific wine regulations are "necessarily
incidental to" or an integral part of or at least "functionally related"
to the central goal of regulating international trade through NAFTA.
Traditionally, wine sales and distribution have been regulated exclusively by the individual provinces, thus the NAFTA wine regulations
could be seen as intruding impermissibly on provincial powers, even
though they are part of a much larger international agreement.
In applying the four criteria of the second prong of Parsons to
determine whether a valid regulatory scheme for "general regulation
of trade" exists, problems immediately arise. It is debatable whether
the wine provisions are overseen by a "regulatory agency" sufficient
to satisfy the intended purpose of the criteria. NAFTA does establish
a trinational commission to review the progress of compliance with
various provisions under the agreement. However, this commission
meets annually, is not located in Canada, and does not deal exclusively with provincial wine import problems. Finally, regulation of the
wine trade may be viewed as regulation of a single trade or business
which is expressly prohibited for the federal government in the Parsons, Margarine,and GeneralMotors cases.
While the regulations are specific to the wine industry, they are
also only one component of the much broader NAFTA pact which
sets broad yet concrete objectives to reduce international trade barriers and increase international market competition. Since the ine
trade is of increasing international economic concern, these regulations appear to be a genuine area of national economic concern, necessarily regulated by the federal government. Further, the refusal of
one or more of the provinces to abide by the regulations could jeopardize the entire agreement. Yet the provinces would be incapable of
legislating uniform wine regulations among themselves. Thus, while
the argument for federal regulation of the import wine trade under
NAFTA may be more convincing under prong two of Parsons, the
result of either prong's application remains highly debatable.
XI.

Conclusion: The Canadian Wine Market

While the Canadian provinces are "generally supportive" of
NAFTA, encroachment by the federal parliament on traditional provincial powers is obviously not welcomed. However, as long as the
provinces voluntarily apply the wine (and other alcoholic beverage)
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provisions, constitutional conflict may be forestalled.1 37 The numerous provincial exceptions to NAFTA's general tariff and nontariff barrier reductions make it difficult to discern whether the agreement will
make a substantial contribution to the removal of discriminatory trade
barriers in the Canadian market. Yet these "grandfathered" provisions along with a provincial consultation requirement-imposed on
the government before it can make federal law implementing
NAFTA' 8 -again postpone constitutional controversy by making the
agreement more palatable to the individual provinces.
Thus, while the impact of NAFTA on the Canadian wine market
could be enormous, it may be hindered by Canadian constitutional
issues and the continued reluctance of the provinces to cede any intraprovincial control. However, the larger dose of competition which
NAFTA has brought to the Canadian wine market thus far seems to
have improved the quality and quantity of Canadian wines. This beneficial effect may spur some provincial governments to reconsider
their historical policy of strict protectionism, even if an international
agreement will not. Despite the persisting tariff and nontariff barriers
under NAFTA, Canada remains a large, fairly stable market for
American wine exports.
Turning to the emerging market of Mexico, this Note will analyze
the impact of NAFTA on increasing U.S. wine exports to Mexico.
XII.

Mexico as an Emerging U.S. Wine Export Market

With the implementation of NAFTA, Mexico is one of the emerging markets which the U.S. wine industry is optimistically, albeit cautiously, eyeing as a large, future market for bulk and table wine
exports. Certainly Mexico has some daunting impediments, especially
for the small winery hoping to export there. The 60% plunge in value
of the Mexican peso in December 199419 reminded U.S. investors and
exporters alike that Mexico's domestic economy is still unstable.
Apart from the fluctuating monetary situation, and the tariff and
nontariff barriers, Mexico's undeveloped distribution channels and
warehousing infrastructure, as well as its general unawareness of
American wine quality and tradition, further serve to limit the Mexican market for U.S. wines. 40
137. See generally DOING BusirNss, supra note 110, at 29-127.
138. See generally id at 29-126.
139. Jonathan Marshall, Peso's Plunge Slams California Exports, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 23,
1995, at B1.
140. See generally Abt Assoc., Report, supra note 21.
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Prior to the peso devaluation, the Mexican wine market had
started to grow and diversify. In 1992 Mexico was the fourth largest
importer of U.S. wines after Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan,
importing US$6.2 million worth of wine from the United States (about
2.9 million gallons).' 4 ' However, in 1993 Mexico was only the sixth
largest importer of U.S. wines, 14 2 due to the global recession which
reduced exports worldwide and decreased U.S. wine exports to Mexico by 57%.143 Some felt these export figures were distorted because
while low cost bulk wine export revenues sank, table wine revenues
generally remained stable."' This demonstrated that table wines
were maintaining their market share and even gaining greater prominence in the Mexican market. Unfortunately, following the 1994 peso
devaluation, Mexico dropped off the list of the top ten highest import
countries for U.S. wines by volume. 45
XIII.

Mexican Constitutional Issues

Unlike Canada and the United States, Mexico is a civil-law country in which international treaty provisions are considered to be selfexecuting. 46 The Mexican wine sections under NAFTA are significantly less complicated than those of Canada, which include many
provisions of specific application to individual provinces. However,
one Mexican constitutional obstacle to the implementation of NAFTA
relating to wine exports involves the dispute resolution process for
antidumping and countervailing duty violations.
Prior to NAFTA, Mexico lacked a judicial review process for administrative decisions. 147 This presented a problem because an independent binational panel established under NAFTA 14s could not
review a Mexican administrative finding of antidumping or countervailing duties. Because no adequate records were made of the admin141.
142.
143.
144.

1993 Trade Barriers Report, supra note 11, at 23.
WIsm INSr. STATisTics, supra note 3, at 15.
Id.
U.S. Wine Exports To Mexico Plunge 60 Percent Despite NAFTA, WrNE Bus. In.
SIDER, Mar. 5, 1994, at 1.
145. U.S. Table Wine Exports Jump 14 Percen: United Kingdom Displaces Canadaas
Top Market; Aussie Bulk Boom, supra note 7, at 1.

146. James F. Smith & Marilyn Whitney, The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the
NAFTA and Agriculture, 68 N.D. L. Rnv. 567, 603 & n.196.
147. McLaughlin, supra note 41, at 24.

148. NAFTA, supra note 26, ch. 19 (dispute resolution procedures for antidumping and
countervailing duty violations). For a discussion of the NAFTA binational panel process,
see Chapter19 of the NAFTA: BinationalPanelsas the Trade CourtsofLast Resort, 4 M:.
TRADE & L. Rrm No. 6 (June 1, 1994).
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istrative determinations, a binational panel could not judge whether
the domestic determination based on Mexican law was properly interpreted and applied under the NAFTA provisions. 149 The imposition
of judicial review for domestic administrative decisions was deemed
politically sensitive in Mexico since it would be a serious intrusion on
Mexico's administrative and judicial sovereignty.' 50 However, Mexico
has manifested a willingness to amend its administrative legal procedures. Since treaty obligations are paramount to domestic laws in
Mexico and the Mexican constitution is "easily amendable," it seems
that this potential constitutional controversy is not too problematic.'-"
XIV.

Background: The Mexican Wine Industry

The first stages of growth in the Mexican wine industry began
with the 1986 lifting of the import ban on wines and other foreign
products. Before 1986, Mexico had attempted to promote domestic
growth by restricting all foreign imports and foreign investment in order to achieve a high level of national self-sufficiency.'5 2 However, in
the late 1970s, Mexico's foreign debt grew to unmanageable levels and
a major 1985 earthquake in Mexico City further fueled Mexico's economic crisis. In response, the Mexican government revamped its domestic economic policies in order to reduce and stabilize inflation and
promote diversified economic growth through privatization and foreign investment. 5 3 In 1986 Mexico became a full member of GATT
and accordingly began to reduce its tariff and nontariff barriers.154 In
August 1992 it instituted changes in its complex regulatory laws which
helped simplify exportation of wines to Mexico.'
Unlike Canada, Mexico has a very limited wine drinking tradition. In 1992 less than a dozen wineries comprised its domestic industry. 5 6 While Canada and the United States ranked twenty-sixth and
twenty-seventh respectively in worldwide per capita consumption of
wine in 1992, Mexico was not even ranked. 5 7 Domestic wine producers and suppliers satisfy 22% of the total wine market in Mexico.'.5
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
Oelstrom, supra note 56, at 89.
MANZELLA, supra note 27, at 5.
ld.

154. Id. at 7.
155.
156.
157.
158.

1993 Trade BarriersReport,supra note 11, at 23.
Abt Assoc., Report, supra note 21, at 1-1.
Wnw INsr. STATiSTiCS, supra note 3, at 10.
Walker, supra note 20, at 53.

1996]

American Wine's New Internationalism

The Mexican supplier, Pedro Domecq Group, dominates this domestic share, controlling up to 64% of the wine market.15 9 However,
NAFTA has increased competition and will likely expand the customer base in Mexico, 1'1 eventually lessening Domecq's domestic
grip.
Spain is Mexico's "chief wine supplier," exporting about 35% of
Mexico's total imports, while Germany follows at 19% and France at
18%.161 Prior to NAFTA, the United States held about 10% of the
import market share, and Chile was not far behind the United States
at 8%.162 Mexican and German low price wines ($3-$9 per bottle)
cater to 60% of the total wine market, while Spain imports wine in the
middle price category and France generally supplies the premium
price wines ($17-$26 per bottle). 63 The primary export to Mexico is
bulk wine, with imports only accounting for a small percentage of
Mexico's table wine market. In 1992 Mexico imported 12% of its total
table wine consumption. 1'
For historical and cultural reasons, European wines have garnered greater prestige and developed a reputation for quality in the
Mexican market that American wines have generally lacked. However, the implementation of NAFTA has created greater interest in
American products, which should boost recognition of California's
rich wine tradition among Mexican consumers. California producers,
in particular, have a distinct advantage in geographical location and
means of transportation over European exporters. Also, through
NAFTA, tariff barriers for the United States and Canada will be reduced substantially over the next few years, while European wine tariffs will remain at 20%. Thus, NAFTA could herald a new era of
tremendous opportunity for wine exporters of the United States, even
if slowly realized.
XV.

NAFTA Tariff Schedule

"The U.S. wine industry considers the reduction of Mexican trade
barriers as a top priority."'165 NAFTA's provisions regarding the gradual reduction of tariffs on U.S. wine will eliminate the original 1993
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id
Abt Assoc., Report, supra note 21, at 1-1.
Walker, supra note 20, at 53.
Id.
Mexico Export Report, supra note 16, at 2.
Id. at 1.
Id
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twenty percent tariff to zero over a ten year phase-out period beginning with NAFTA's implementation in 1994 and ending in 2003.166
This phase-out schedule reduces the tariff on wine exports by 2% per
year. The schedule is identical for bulk, table, and sparkling wines,
and brandy. 167 The schedule is accelerated, however, for wine coolers
and fortified wines. 161
The California wine industry expressed concern in 1993 that this
phase-out plan is too slow in light of the fact that Mexico already has a
special agreement with Chile to levy only an 8% tariff on Chile's wine
exports, with this tariff quickly reducing to zero by 1996-far ahead of
the current NAFTA reductions. 169 This accelerated tariff elimination
for Chilean exports would give the Chilean wine industry a solid foothold in the Mexican market and would potentially do great harm to
U.S. exporters' prospects there. Chile has a robust and rapidly expanding wine export program which already claimed 8% of the Mexican import wine market in 1992.170
As a concession to the California wine industry, the Clinton Administration pledged in late 1993, weeks before NAFTA's implementation, to bring the tariff schedule for U.S. wines in line with tariffs on
Chilean wines, and that such negotiations would start within 120 days
of the NAFTA signing.' 7 ' NAFTA Article 302 provides for renegotiation of tariff schedules. 172 Unfortunately, these continuing negotiations have not yet produced any acceleration in the U.S. wine tariff
schedules, 173 and seem unlikely to do so in the near future. 174
XVI.

Other Tariff Barriers

Although Mexico removed its excise tax barriers, Mexico's imported wines are still subject to an alcohol trade tax (1EPS) and a 10%
166. 1&. at 7.
167. Id.
168. Id.

169. Larry Walker, Wine ProducersTargeting Mexico, WirNE & SPIRrrs, Sept. 7, 1993, at
9.
170. Walker, supra note 20, at 53.

171. Id. at 18.
172. NAFrA, supra note 26, art. 302(2).

173. U.S/Mexican Wine Tariff Talks Continue, 2 NEws BRIEFs (Wine Inst., S.F., Cal.),
July 1, 1994, at 2.
174. Kantor Signals Impatience with Mexico Over Restrictions on U.S. Tire Imports, 12

Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 899 (May 24, 1995) (The Mexican government has attempted to indicate that certain areas of NAFTA, such as the wine area, could not be
reopened for negotiation.).
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value added tax (IVA).175 These two taxes are imposed in addition to
the 16% (originally 20%) ad valorem tax. The alcohol trade tax essentially replaced the excise tax and is levied upon those simply dealing in the trade of alcoholic beverages. 6 Its rate varies from 19% to
44.5% based on the product's alcoholic content and is applied to both
domestic and imported wines. 177 The value added tax also applies domestically; however, shipping costs of the wine are included in the assessment of this tax. Since the actual tax is significantly greater for
imported wines than for domestic ones, it may be in violation of
NAFTA's national treatment provision, as discussed earlier. 7 ,

XVII. Nontariff Barriers
A.

Origin Rules and Customs Administration

NAFTA reduces tariffs for goods made only in North America.
Thus NAFTA's rules of origin are strict in determining whether goods
qualify for preferential treatment under the agreement's terms. These
rules reward companies using North American components and labor
and prevent "free riders" from benefiting through minor processing or
transshipment of non-NAFTA goods.1 79 Due to the nature of the
product, most U.S. wineries should not be inconvenienced by these
strict rules of origin, although a certificate of origin must accompany
all U.S. wine exports under NAFTA.160 Furthermore, customs administration will be uniform under NAFTA in order to make the exportation of all Canadian, Mexican, or U.S. products easier and more
predictable.
Mexico currently calculates the value of an imported good for
customs purposes using the C.I.F. (cost-insurance-freight) value at the
port of import.' 8 ' Under the C.I.F. system, the "value" of the wine
would include the cost of transporting it to the Mexican port or airport where the shipment first enters Mexico. The United States has
been negotiating with Mexico to base the customs valuation system on
175. U.S. Alcoholic Beverages Exports to Mexico, Briefing Paper (Agricultural Trad2
Office, Mexico City, Mexico).
176. 1993 Trade BarriersRepor4 supra note 11, at 23.
177. Id. at 24.
178. NAFITA, supra note 26, art. 301.
179. Anne M. Driscoll, Embracing Chang4 Enhancing Competitiveness: NAFTA's Key
Provisions,Bus. AM., Oct. 18, 1993, at 15.

180. Mexico Export Report,supra note 16, at 4.
181. Id at 9.
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the F.O.B. (free on board) system, which the United States uses. 182
Under the F.O.B. system, the only transportation costs considered
would be the cost of shipping the wine to the port or airport from
which the wine is exported. Since Mexican tariffs are assessed as a
percentage of the value of the imported wine, C.I.F. valuation can resuit in higher tariff charges. Mexico has preliminarily agreed to switch
to an F.O.B. system, but no concrete action has been taken to implement this change.'" 3 Finally, a customs processing fee of 0.8% (up
from 0.6%) is added to the import duties.'8s
B. Registrationand Licensing Requirements
The large burden imposed by Mexico's wine export registration
requirements was lifted in August 1992 when the White House successfully negotiated their removal."8 5 Furthermore, no import license
has been required in Mexico since 1987.186 However, in order to export wine to Mexico, the supplier must obtain a Mexican importer or
representative registered with the Mexican Secretary of Finance and
Public Credit (SHCP). This ministry is responsible for import authorization for alcoholic drinks.'8 7 The Mexican importer or representative must then notify the SHCP and receive permission before the
goods can be shipped.'8 In the past, these notification and permission requirements were considered a nontariff barrier. Today, however, they are mere formalities, serving only to give the SHCP notice
of future tax revenues.' 8 9
C. Ribboning
The SHCP also regulates "ribboning" of imported wines and
other alcoholic beverages. Ribboning indicates that the imported
product entered the country legally; however, the process increases
the retail cost of each bottle of wine an average of sixteen cents."'
Prior to the fall of 1992, Mexican importers were allowed to ribbon
bottles in their own warehouses. Now, however, it can only be done
182. Id
183. Id

184. Id at 6.
185. 1993 Trade BarriersReport, supra note 11, at 23.

186. Id From 1982 to 1986, wine imports faced a 100% tariff and required import
licenses. See Abt Assoc., Report, supra note 21, at 5-4.
187. Abt Assoc., Report, supra note 21, at 5-2.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id at 5-3.
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at five designated SHCP warehouses, which are also the exclusive suppliers of the ribbons. 191 Further, the Mexican importers must use
their own employees to ribbon the bottles at the government warehouses. 192 This new ribboning law (known as the treasury tax stamp
or the tax strip stamp) has discouraged large discount supermarket
chains like Gigante from importing wine directly from the United
States, thus reducing the quantity of American wines sold on their
shelves. 193 Currently, about 67% of demand in the retail wine market
is satisfied by sale through the large Mexican supermarket chains like
Gigante. 94
D. Labeling, Shipping, and Distribution
Labeling requirements present another potential nontariff barrier
for importing wine to Mexico. Currently, all imported wines must
have a label affixed to either the front or back of the bottle which
gives particular consumer information in Spanish such as the brand,
alcohol content, country of origin, name of producer and importer,
and a health warning.' 95 The minimum requirement for the label is an
adhesive sticker with the designated information printed on it. However, in the spring of 1994 the Mexican government proposed new
labeling restrictions which would ban the use of sticker labels on all
products, including wine. 196 These regulations, if implemented, would
significantly increase production costs for wine exporters since they
would have to estimate their wine sales to Mexico for the coming year
and then separately produce and affix the special nonadhesive Spanish
label at the winery.
As for distribution in Mexico, large supermarkets and liquor
stores make up the biggest percentage of the retail market. However,
the institutional market which encompasses specialty and chain restaurants and hotels is particularly appealing to U.S. wine exporters
since it is expected to grow steadily under NAFrA. 1 7 Nevertheless,
Mexico lacks the necessary infrastructure to make most forms of
transport and distribution operationally efficient, which poses a substantial functional barrier to delicate wine exports.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
1994).
197.

Id
Id
Id
Id at 3-6.
Mexico Export Report, supra note 16, at 5.
Mexico ProposesNew Label Restrictions,2
Abt Assoc., Report, supra note 21, at 3-10.
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Trucking and maritime shipping are the two favored ways of
transporting California wines to Mexico.' 98 However, the Mexican
trucking industry often faces shortages of equipment, relies on second-hand equipment, and overloads cargo. Moreover, efficiency is
further reduced by the poor condition of many Mexican roads.' 99
Drawbacks of maritime shipping include inadequate port equipment,
lack of proper organization at the port, and lack of qualified port employees. 200 Because wine is a product which may be easily damaged
by extreme or fluctuating temperatures or other unstable conditions,
Mexico's transportation problems present key difficulties for fine wine
producers trying to ensure their wine is not vinegar when it reaches
the Mexican consumer's table.
XVII.

European Competition and the Chile Wild Card

As mentioned above, domestic suppliers dominate the Mexican
wine market, but there is increasing competition from very inexpensive imports, primarily from Europe.20 ' Germany, in particular, has
flooded Mexico with cheap white wines.202 Mexican wineries are extremely concerned and have negotiated with the government for the
imposition of antidumping remedies, but the Mexican government has
yet to take action.2 3 Furthermore, cheap wine "dumping" would
make it especially difficult for U.S. wineries to compete in a saturated
Mexican market, and will probably further chill negotiations for, an
accelerated tariff reduction under NAFTA's phase-out schedule.
Chile, on the other hand, already receives preferential treatment
for its wines in the Mexican market with its tariffs far below (2.5%
tariff on fine wines in 1995) both the United States (16%) and European (20%) tariff levels. In 1991, a year before Chile's special tariff
reduction schedule went into effect, Chile held a slightly smaller market share for imported wines in Mexico than the United States. 204
U.S. wine exporters are trying to renegotiate the NAFTA tariff schedule with Mexico. Regarding the increased Chilean competition, the
198. AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS OFFICE, U.S. EMASSY, MEXICO, TRANSPORT AND DISTRIBUTION CONTACTS AND PROCEDURES IN THE MEXICAN MARKET FOR HIGIiER VALVED
PROCESSED AND SEMI-PRoCESSED FOODS 14 (1991).

199. Iat
200. Id.
201. Abt Assoc., Report, supra note 21, at 1-1.
202. Id. at i3.
203. I. "Dumping" occurs when a state exports a product to sell in a foreign state at a
cost significantly below the cost of that same product in the exporting market.
204. Id. at 5-7.
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Wine Institute and other industry members recently protested the
possibility of the U.S. entering into a trade agreement with Chile
which would further lower the tariffs on Chilean wines entering the
U.S.205 However, Canada favors Chile's inclusion in NAF1TA$L and
the United States, Canada, and Mexico were expected to begin formal
negotiations with Chile in mid-1995 for Chilean accession to
NAFA.20 7 Even if these negotiations move slowly, at least one California winery is already involved in a forward-looking partnership
with a Chilean winery. Recently, the Robert Mondavi Winery announced a 50150 joint venture with the Caliterra line of vines to produce Chilean wines and market them in Europe and the United States
beginning in 19 9 V1s
8
XIX.

Conclusion: The Mexican Wine Market

Since Mexico became a member of GAIT, its market has been
opening slowly to U.S. wine exports. NAFTA increases this access
and over time will probably increase the purchasing power of the average Mexican consumer. However the current economic recession in
Mexico, competition from Mexican wineries as well as European and
Chilean imports, and the overall lack of a wine-drinking tradition in
Mexico may keep U.S. wine sales from climbing rapidly in the short
run. In the long run many American wineries see the market as "too
enormous and dynamic to be ignored." ' Indeed, NAFTA has generated a cautious enthusiasm for wine exports to Mexico which is likely
to continue, even if progress is slower than initially anticipated.
Under NAFTA, for the "first time wine has become an essential element in trade negotiations, not something thrown in or bargained
away at the end," said John DeLucca, President of the Wine Institute.210 "I feel this period is a turning point in the history of our industry. The California
wine industry has truly become an
2 11
industry."
international
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XX. Final Conclusion
Although wine trade issues are a very small part of the overall
agreement, NAFTA still reflects the current realization of how important the wine industry is to the United States, especially California,
and hints at the increasingly prominent role wine exports will play in
future negotiations. Special problems arise in the exportation of
wines and other alcoholic beverages to foreign nations. Governments
have historically regulated consumption of alcohol in order to reduce
public health risks and the potential for social disruption. At the same
time, however, they have also erected trade barriers to promote domestic wine and spirits industries and protect them from foreign competition. Other factors such as warehousing and distribution structure
(or lack thereof) and environmental regulations can increase trade
barriers. Finally, Europe's long winemaking tradition, its reputation
for quality, and its established export programs further hinder successful wine exports from the United States to nations with cultural ties to
Europe, such as Canada and Mexico.
Notwithstanding, NAFTA directly states that wine exports generally must be accorded national treatment within the importing country
and any restrictions on the wine trade must be transparent, nondiscriminatory, and not designed to create disguised barriers to trade.
NAFTA's specific focus on wine barriers provides concrete tariff elimination schedules as well as clear guidelines for reducing nontariff barriers. Additionally, it institutes a more efficient dispute settlement
process than was originally offered by GATr in this area.
While some large U.S. wineries have already accessed both the
Mexican and Canadian markets, NAFTA should encourage more wineries to develop export programs in these countries by making exporting to them more routine, less complicated, and more profitable.
Ultimately, by reducing tariff barriers and curbing unfair trade practices NAFTA provides opportunities for the growth of American wine
exports in both the established Canadian market and the emerging
market of Mexico.

